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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a member of the armed forces on active duty who
happens to have a bit too much to drink during an on-base party. A fellow
service member helps you to your barracks, returns later, and rapes you.
You later find out that he has a prior felony assault conviction, which the
military failed to discover during his enlistment. You sue the government
for the military’s negligence in hiring your attacker. However, you are
unable to recover solely because you are an active duty service member.
These facts are similar to those of Gonzalez v. United States Air Force,
an unpublished decision rendered by the Tenth Circuit. 1 The court
dismissed the suit under the doctrine the Supreme Court announced in
Feres v. United States, which states that the government is not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for injuries incurred by military
members on active duty providing that the injuries arose out of activities
incident to service. 2 Courts bar virtually every tort claim through an
expanded meaning of the Feres Doctrine, which finds that almost every
injury that occurs to a service member arises directly out of his or her
military service. 3 According to judicial interpretations, service-related
injuries include those that occur when a military member is on active duty,
subject to military discipline, or while performing a recreational activity
1. See 88 Fed. Appx. 371, 372-73 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that a service member,
Kerry Nazario, raped the plaintiff, Nicolette Gonzalez, after helping her back to her barracks
as she had been drinking at an on-base party).
2. See id. at 375 (dismissing the claim under the Feres Doctrine because the injury
occurred while the plaintiff was on active duty and subject to military discipline); see also
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (preventing active military members from
bringing tort claims against the federal government for injuries that arose out of service).
3. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) [hereinafter Johnson I]
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Feres was incorrect because it created “unfairness and
irrationality” in later decisions); see also Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223-24
(10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991))
(noting that courts have broadened Feres to bar any claim even slightly related to a
plaintiff’s status as a military member, even if the claim does not appear to relate to military
decisions).
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that relates to military service. 4
This Comment’s analysis focuses on the facts that arose in Gonzalez and
argues that a more appropriate holding would have provided the plaintiff
with a remedy. 5 Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of
both the FTCA and the Feres Doctrine and introduces the plaintiff’s claim
in Gonzalez and the decision of the Tenth Circuit. 6 Part II analyzes how
civilian courts have expanded the meaning behind the Feres Doctrine
dramatically, and argues that Feres should not have barred the plaintiff’s
claim in Gonzalez. 7 Part II further discusses why the discretionary function
and intentional tort exceptions to the FTCA should not bar the plaintiff’s
claim and explains why the Ninth Circuit’s negligent hiring analysis would
have been appropriate in Gonzalez. 8 This Comment concludes that the
Tenth Circuit could have decided Gonzalez differently and allowed the
plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her case had the court not
dismissed the case on a jurisdictional technicality. 9
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act and its Exceptions
One possible basis for civil redress for sexual assault claims that occur in
the military is under the FTCA. 10 At common law, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity shielded the federal government from liability for torts
committed by federal employees. 11 In response to the many private bills
4. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (explaining that Feres bars recovery for
incidents occurring during social and recreational activities that service members engage in
and also those injuries that occur when a service member is subject to military discipline,
such as attending an on-base party).
5. See id. at 375 (dismissing the claim under Feres for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and leaving the plaintiff without a remedy in civilian courts, since the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides for plaintiffs to bring cases only in federal court); see
also Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth
Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 751 (2002) (arguing that victims of sexual
harassment usually are left without much of a remedy through the military justice process).
6. See infra Part I (explaining the relevant case law and statutes related to Gonzalez
and the FTCA).
7. See infra Part II (arguing that the court was incorrect in its analysis as it focused on
the moment of the injury and not on the negligence).
8. See infra Part II (arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a
negligent hiring case and decide the case in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
FTCA).
9. See infra pp. 667-68 (concluding that the over-expanded application of Feres and
the majority viewpoint of the intentional tort exception frustrate the purpose of the FTCA).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2005) (granting a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
for claims by federal workers against the government for torts that arise while the
employees are acting within the scope of their employment); see also Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953) (stating that one of the purposes of the FTCA is to provide
a remedy to persons injured due to the actions of federal employees).
11. See William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of
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that attempted to provide an avenue for redress for those injured by federal
employees, Congress passed the FTCA. 12 The FTCA grants a limited
waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity and holds the government
liable for torts committed by federal employees. 13 However, the FTCA
contains specific exceptions to this waiver, which include: (1) the
discretionary function exception; (2) the intentional tort exception; and (3)
the exception for claims that arise out of combat. 14 These exceptions,
among others, protect certain government activities from judicial
questioning. 15 In early cases, courts found that Congress intended for
members of the armed forces to have the ability to sue the federal
government for claims of negligence under the FTCA. 16 The specificity
within the language of the FTCA led courts to believe that Congress
intended it to apply directly to those in active duty, as long as their claims
did not fall under one of the exceptions to the FTCA. 17
The Supreme Court first addressed the purpose behind the FTCA in
Brooks v. United States and found that the statute allowed active duty
service members to recover monetary damages from the federal
government based upon its language and framework. 18 The Court found
that the plaintiffs could recover damages because their injuries did not
occur incident to service, as they were not obeying military orders at the
Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
1105, 1107 (1996) (explaining that regardless of the merits of the claim, under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, no one could sue the government for torts committed by its
employees).
12. See id. (stating that Congress passed the FTCA because it became too burdened by
the numerous private bills).
13. See § 1346(b) (allowing plaintiffs to file suit against the government in federal court
for a federal employee’s negligence in circumstances where “the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant”); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2005) (defining “employees” to
include members of the military); see also Coe v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 881, 885 (D.
Or. 1980) (stating that § 1346(b) of the FTCA waives sovereign immunity of the federal
government only to the extent that a plaintiff could hold a private person liable).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (2005) (excepting numerous other issues from the
waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity).
15. See Kratzke, supra note 11, at 1113-14 (explaining that the legislative history of the
FTCA provides little explanation for having all these exceptions, beyond shielding the
government from judicial critique).
16. See, e.g., Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D. Mont. 1948)
(detailing a history of the government providing support for soldiers and, therefore,
doubting that Congress would have changed that policy with the FTCA); Samson v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (finding that Congress’s repeal of the Military
Claims Act indicated its intent for soldiers to be able to seek redress under the FTCA).
17. See Alansky, 77 F. Supp. at 558 (finding that the explicit language within the FTCA
specifically defines members of the military as “employees”); see also § 2680(a)-(n)
(excepting certain claims from the waiver of sovereign immunity, such as when it is based
on a discretionary function, is an intentional tort, is combat-related, or occurs in a foreign
country).
18. See 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949) (explaining that two servicemen and their father were
riding in a vehicle on a public road when a military truck struck the vehicle, which was
stopped at a stop sign, killing one and severely injuring the other two plaintiffs).
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time of their injuries. 19 The Court, however, failed to address how it would
decide the case if the injury had arisen incident to service. 20
1. The Discretionary Function Exception Bars Claims that Allege
Negligence in Decisions Made by Federal Employees
The FTCA’s discretionary function exception bars claims based on the
government’s negligence in failing to perform a duty based on a
discretionary function, which is a decision made using judgment. 21 In
Dalehite v. United States, the Supreme Court created a distinction between
activities at a planning level and those at an operational level. 22 Decisions
at the planning level inherently involve discretion, as they are decisions
that attempt to plan a course of action, and protect the government from
Decisions at the operational level, however, are not
liability. 23
discretionary, because they are merely decisions that put the plan into
effect. 24
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has created a two-step process to
determine whether the discretionary function exception applies. 25 The first
prong questions whether the decision required any element of choice on the
part of the employee. 26 If regulations bound the employee’s course of
action, thereby leaving the employee with no discretion in making his
19. See id. at 52 (finding that the plaintiff’s military service alone was irrelevant to the
car accident which caused the injuries).
20. See id. (indicating that the result might be different if the injury had occurred due to
service-related activities, but specifically declining to answer that question).
21. See § 2680(a) (stating that the government is exempt from liability for any claim
based upon a decision made by a federal employee, where the employee was using his own
discretion).
22. See 346 U.S. at 35-36 (stating that persons make discretionary decisions at the
planning level because such decisions are policy judgments that extend to the scheduling
and initiation of activities, while decisions at the operational level are not discretionary and,
therefore, subject the government to liability); see also United States v. Varig Airlines, 467
U.S. 797, 812-13 (1984) (noting that Dalehite still stands as a valid interpretation of the
discretionary function exception despite analysis that may be to the contrary).
23. See Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (providing an
example of an action at the planning level as the creation of the standards used to judge
military enlistees).
24. See id. at 912 (explaining that the decision to enlist a specific applicant into the
military is a decision at the operational level, and thus makes the government liable).
25. See William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12-23 (1993)
(stating that the Supreme Court shaped the discretionary function test in a recent trilogy of
decisions, Varig Airlines, Berkovitz v. United States and United States v. Gaubert).
26. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (explaining that the
language of the exception mandates this prong because if an element of choice exists in the
employee’s decision-making, this inherently involves discretion and does not subject the
government to liability); see also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991)
(explaining that where a regulation proscribed certain conduct, and the employee followed
this regulation, there is no liability because the employee did not use any discretion).
However, if the employee performs contrary to its requirements, then the government is
liable. Id.
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decision, then the exception does not apply and the government is subject
to potential liability. 27 The second prong questions whether the decision
involved is the type of action that Congress intended to shield from
liability. 28 This step determines whether the application of the exception
protects against the questioning of certain types of decisions, such as those
grounded in social, economic or political policy. 29
2. The Intentional Tort Exception Prohibits Claims that Allege the
Occurrence of an Assault or Battery
Although the FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the federal
government in tort suits, it expressly prevents a plaintiff from bringing a
suit alleging injury from assault and battery. 30 As a way to circumvent the
intentional tort suit bar, plaintiffs in the past attempted to couch their
assault claims as ones of negligence on the part of the government. 31 In
response, courts began to analyze the substance of the claim to determine
whether it arose out of the government’s negligence or out of an actual
assault or battery. 32 In United States v. Shearer, the Supreme Court held
that the intentional tort exception barred not only those claims that alleged
injury caused by an assault or battery directly, but also those claims that
27. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (stating that where there are regulations, the
employee is bound to follow them and, therefore, the conduct of the employee is not based
on choice).
28. See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813 (explaining that it is the nature of the actions
taken by the employee that is the relevant focus, not the fact that the employee works for the
government).
29. See id. at 813-14 (explaining that, under this exception, Congress intended to
exempt from judicial scrutiny certain legislative and administrative decisions in order to
protect the independence of the branches). The purpose of protecting against inquiry into
certain types of decisions was to ensure that courts did not subject the government’s
decisions regulating the conduct of private persons to liability. Id.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2005) (barring intentional tort claims arising from
“assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”); see also
Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1983) (articulating that the
underlying policy behind the intentional tort exception is to “insulate the government from
liability” for torts that it was “powerless to prevent”).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 53-55 (1985) (alleging that the
military was negligent in its supervision of a serviceman who had committed manslaughter
while on active duty, yet whom the military had transferred to another base upon his release
from prison). After his transfer, the perpetrator kidnapped and murdered the plaintiff’s son.
Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the military had a duty to warn others of the
perpetrator’s predisposition to commit violence. Id.
32. See, e.g., Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 912-13 (noting cases from the Third and Fifth
Circuits where the courts refused to dismiss the negligence claim where the injuries arose
from an employee’s negligent actions despite the fact that the injuries originally stemmed
from an assault and battery); see also Coffey v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D.
Conn. 1975) (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim alleged that the Marine Guard who shot
him was negligent in discharging his gun). The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint fell
under the intentional tort exception because he disguised his claim as one based on
negligence, as it was clear from the substance of the claim that it focused on the assault,
rather than on negligence. Id.
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alleged an injury caused by negligence, despite the injury physically
occurring from an assault or battery. 33
The Court felt that broad immunity better served the purpose behind the
FTCA as Congress never intended for the government to be liable for
intentional torts committed by its employees. 34 By finding that the
intentional tort exception encompassed claims of negligence, even if the
assault or battery was the basis of the claim, the Court expanded the notion
of the intentional tort exception. 35 Even though it is only a plurality
opinion, the Shearer holding has prevailed in the majority of circuits. 36
B. Negligent Hiring
An employer has a duty to exercise due care in the hiring of employees,
and if the employer breaches this duty, a court may hold the employer
liable for injuries caused by a negligently hired employee. 37 As the
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in relation to the military, the
circuits lack guidance on whether they can analyze negligent hiring claims
under the FTCA. 38 The majority of the circuits have held that the
intentional tort exception bars most negligent hiring claims because but for
the intentional tort, the claim itself never would have occurred. 39 However,
33. See 473 U.S. at 55-56 (explaining that the language “arising out of” encompasses
negligence claims, as the FTCA protects the government from being liable for assaults and
batteries committed by its employees). The Court further explained that the lack of
supervision could not be the basis for the government’s liability. Id.
34. See id. at 55 (indicating that the legislative history of the FTCA made it clear that
courts should not hold the government liable for intentional acts, because the government
was not in a position to prevent the assaults and batteries of its employees).
35. See id. (prohibiting a negligent supervision claim under the language of § 2680(h)
because the legislative history indicated that courts should read the statute broadly); see also
Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the intentional
tort exception bars a claim that stems originally from an intentional tort, even if the claim is
for negligence).
36. See, e.g., Franklin, 992 F.2d at 1498 (adopting the plurality reasoning in Shearer
and finding that the exception barred any claim that arose from assault and battery, despite
any negligence on the part of the government); Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031,
1034 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the
broad view of Shearer and similarly have barred negligence claims that arose from
intentional torts). But see Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to recognize the Shearer analysis as binding because the discussion came from a
plurality and, therefore, lacks precedential value). The court held that a claim based on an
injury arising from an assault and battery did not excuse the government’s negligence. Id.
37. See, e.g., Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910 n.4 (Minn. 1983) (listing
some of the states that have recognized negligent hiring claims, including Alaska,
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas
and Tennessee).
38. Compare Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to
adopt the Shearer reasoning regarding negligent hiring claims because it is only a plurality
opinion with little precedential force), with Guccione, 847 F.2d at 1034 (adopting the
reasoning in Shearer and stating that the language of the exception applies broadly enough
to bar claims that stem from negligence but arise directly out of an intentional tort).
39. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1985) (arguing that a
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the Ninth Circuit has allowed negligent hiring claims to be heard, basing its
reasoning on the nature of the FTCA itself, and refusing to adopt the
Shearer plurality opinion. 40 Instead, the Ninth Circuit has stated that
claims alleging negligent hiring on the part of the government that are
independent from the assault or battery, and in which the negligence is the
proximate cause of the injury, could give rise to liability. 41
C. Affirmative Duties
The intentional tort exception usually does not bar claims that allege that
the government employer had an affirmative duty to the plaintiff and knew
or should have known that an employee was likely to commit an injurious
act. 42 If the injury to the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the
government’s negligence, courts do not consider the assault or battery a
supervening act that nullifies the government’s negligence. 43 In Sheridan
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that there are situations where a
negligent act by a government employee is enough to hold the government
liable, provided that an affirmative duty existed on the part of the
government prior to the negligence. 44 This liability exists even if an assault
or battery caused the plaintiff’s injury because the military had an
affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff. 45 The Court found that the
government has a duty to prevent a foreseeably dangerous person from
injuring another, regardless of the perpetrator’s military status or his intent
claim based on a negligent act arises from an assault, not from the negligence itself, and is
therefore barred under the FTCA). See generally Guccione, 847 F.2d at 1034 (noting that
many of the circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth, have interpreted Shearer
to bar negligent hiring claims because of the claim’s basis in an assault).
40. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (arguing that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide a
forum for broad relief for negligent tort actions committed by government employees); see
also Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504 (finding that the purpose of the FTCA is not to grant broad
immunity to the government, but is instead to allow for a wide range of federal employees
to bring claims).
41. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (finding that the government could be held liable for
negligently hiring and supervising a postal worker and for failing to warn others of the
postal worker’s dangerous tendencies, because the government knew or should have known
of the postal worker’s past actions). The court remanded this case for further consideration
on the merits, finding that the district court failed to analyze the claim correctly. Id.
42. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that
if the government undertakes a duty to care for or instruct others, it assumes an affirmative
duty to protect its employees from those who are violent).
43. See id. at 1395 (finding that courts could hold the government liable when it
assumed a duty to care for and instruct others).
44. See 487 U.S. 392, 401 (1988) (holding the government liable for an intentional
assault with a firearm by a drunken serviceman because the military had assumed an
affirmative duty to care for its service members and neglected to uphold this duty). The
Court found that the military had adopted regulations prohibiting firearms on-base and
various service members failed to report the presence of a firearm or to care for the visibly
drunk serviceman with the firearm. Id.
45. See id. at 403 (finding that liability exists regardless of the military status of the
perpetrator, thereby declining to address negligent hiring).
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to commit the assault. 46 Following Sheridan, courts began to adopt this
rationale by stating that if the government had an affirmative duty to
protect the plaintiff prior to the assault, the intentional tort exception does
not bar the claim. 47
D. The Feres Doctrine
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the question it
reserved in Brooks 48 and examined whether the FTCA was applicable to
injuries that occurred incident to service. 49 The Court held that the
government was not liable under the FTCA for injuries military members
incurred while on active duty as long as they arose out of or occurred in the
course of activity “incident to service.” 50 Feres, the Court found, was
factually a different case than Brooks, because the Brooks plaintiff was not
on active duty at the time of his injury and because the military had
discharged him before he filed suit. 51
The Court in Feres articulated three rationales for barring claims that
arise in the course of activity incident to service: (1) the location where the
plaintiff brings the tort claim should not govern the law that courts apply in
the suit; (2) the relationship between the military and the United States
Government is uniquely federal and, therefore, should be exempt from
judicial inquiry; and (3) most military-related claims are covered by other
statutory compensation systems. 52 Using these rationales, the Court denied
relief to the plaintiffs, further stating that the FTCA did not provide a new
avenue of liability for military members, and that no current law existed

46. See id. at 400-03 (holding the government liable based on the service member’s
negligence in allowing for the assault to occur). The Court found it irrelevant that the
drunken serviceman’s actions resulted in an intentional assault. Id.
47. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that if a duty existed prior to the assault, the assault is fully independent from any claim of
negligence); see also Loritts v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-32 (D. Mass. 1980)
(finding the government negligent in failing to ensure the safety of females invited to West
Point, despite the fact that it voluntarily had assumed this duty). This negligence led to the
plaintiff’s rape. Id.
48. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (declining to consider the outcome of a situation where
the injury arose out of combatant activities, as that was not the issue presented).
49. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135 (consolidating three different cases that raised similar
issues relating to the injuries of service members that occurred while on active duty).
50. See id. at 146 (explaining that injuries that occur “incident to service” are those that
arise while performing a military duty, under military orders or on a military mission).
51. Compare id. at 136-37 (noting that the plaintiff was carrying out his orders by
remaining in his barracks with an unsafe heating device), with Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50
(noting the plaintiff’s non-military status at the time of the suit, and indicating that he was
driving along a public highway and under no compulsion or duty).
52. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-46 (justifying the reasons that military members cannot
sue the government for injuries that arise incident to service). The Court further stated that
it was unable to find any case law that allowed a private individual to sue for injuries similar
to those in the case at bar. Id. at 141-42.
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that allowed military members to sue their superiors for negligence. 53
In the years after Feres, courts began to focus their reasoning on the
military status of the plaintiff at the time of the suit, rather than on his or
her status when the injury originally occurred, 54 while continuing to affirm
the use of the “incident to service” rationale. 55 The Ninth Circuit laid out
four factors to use as guideposts, not definitively, to determine whether an
injury occurred “incident to service”: (1) the location where the negligent
act occurred; (2) whether the victim was on duty when the negligent act
occurred; (3) whether the victim accrued any benefits as a service member
at the time of injury; and (4) the nature of the victim’s activities at the time
of the negligent act. 56 Further, courts have articulated that there must be a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether precluding the claim would
serve the purpose behind the Feres Doctrine. 57 However, the single
prevailing concern that guides courts in their determination that Feres bars
tort claims by service members is the fear that military order and discipline
might be undermined if military personnel were permitted to sue for
wrongful conduct. 58

53. See id. at 146 (barring the claim because Congress did not intend to create a new
statutory scheme based on state law for service-related injuries when federal law has always
governed these situations).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (reasoning that Feres
did not bar the suit because his civilian status at the time of the suit exempted it from the
“incident to service” analysis); see also Watt v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 386, 388
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding that Feres did not bar the claim of a retired soldier injured in a
military hospital because the injury did not occur while he was on active duty; thus, it was
not incident to service). But see Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1974)
(stating that the relevant inquiry to determine whether an injury is incident to service is the
plaintiff’s status at the time of injury).
55. See Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the
cases that interpret “incident to service” are irreconcilable); see also Mariano v. United
States, 444 F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (E.D. Va. 1977) (finding “incident to service” to be a
broad term, not restricted to the military context).
56. See Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that it
cannot reconcile prior Feres decisions and, therefore, courts should not use bright line rules
to determine whether the Doctrine bars the claim). Furthermore, the court stated that the
best way to determine whether Feres bars the claim is a comparison to prior decisions. Id.
at 849.
57. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (indicating
that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Feres and existing precedent does not bar an
FTCA suit merely because the plaintiff’s injuries occurred while carrying out militaryrelated orders).
58. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691 (indicating that civilian court judgments would
undermine a service member’s duty to the military because it would disrupt military
discipline); see also Moore v. Pa. Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 216 F. Supp. 2d
446, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (highlighting the “special status of the military,” thus exempting it
from the civilian judicial system). But see Mazur, supra note 5, at 718 & n.101 (noting that
Scalia’s dissent in Johnson I argued that the protection of military order and discipline was a
“‘later-conceived-of’ rationale” that did not exist at the time the Court decided Feres).
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E. Gonzalez v. United States Air Force
In 1999, a fellow Air Force member, Kerry Nazario, raped
servicewoman Nicolette Gonzalez while she was sleeping in her barracks
after an on-base party in Oklahoma. 59 The Air Force court-martialed her
attacker, and Gonzalez brought suit against the United States Government,
alleging numerous negligent acts on the part of the military. 60 The Tenth
Circuit, admitting that the circumstances were tragic, affirmed the decision
of the district court, which had dismissed her case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 61 The court reasoned that because the plaintiff sustained her
injuries incident to service, Feres barred her claims. 62
F. Negligence Claims under Oklahoma Law
In order for the plaintiff in Gonzalez to bring a negligence claim under
the FTCA, she must demonstrate four elements under Oklahoma law: (1)
that the military owed a duty to her; (2) that it breached this duty when it
negligently hired Nazario; and (3) that the breach proximately caused (4)
her injury. 63 To prove the chain of causation, there cannot be any
supervening acts, which are acts that are: (1) independent of the original
negligence; (2) able to bring about the injury itself; and (3) not foreseeable
based on the original negligence. 64 Although a criminal act by a third party
is generally considered a supervening event, there are two types of special
relationships that create the duty to prevent the criminal actions of a third
party and thus cause the original actor to be liable: (1) if the actor had a
special duty to the person injured; or (2) where the actor’s affirmative
59. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (indicating that her attacker helped her back to
her barracks, noted the broken lock on her door, and returned later to rape her).
60. See id. (indicating that Gonzalez brought suit for monetary relief under the FTCA
“for negligence, gross negligence, and violation of statutory duties,” along with a Title VII
civil rights claim); see also United States v. Nazario, 56 M.J. 572, 573 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2001) (affirming Nazario’s sentence of “dishonorable discharge, confinement for twenty
months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction” of grade level).
61. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (stating that to allow the claim would question
military discipline because the injury occurred while she was at an on-base party).
62. See id. at 374-75 (holding that the framework of the Ninth Circuit in Dreier
demonstrates that Feres bars claims for injuries that occur on-base and while the plaintiff
was on active duty and “subject to military discipline and control”).
63. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) (stating the
elements of a negligence claim). The elements are:
(a)[F]acts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the
standard of conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff; (b) failure of the
defendant to conform to the standard of conduct; (c) that such failure is a legal cause of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind
legally compensable by damages.
Id.
64. See Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1982) (stating
that a supervening cause breaks the causal chain and protects the “original actor from
liability”).
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action has exposed the injured person to a high degree of risk. 65
Oklahoma law further recognizes that under the proximate cause
analysis, the passage of time may qualify as a supervening event. 66 The
Fifth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is sufficient for proximate cause purposes if
the [actor], as a reasonably prudent person, could or should have foreseen
that someone” might be injured by the actor’s negligence, despite a lapse in
time. 67 In negligent hiring cases, as long as a court can determine that the
proximate cause of the injury was the employer’s negligence in hiring, the
passage of time between the injury and the hiring does not qualify as a
supervening act. 68
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Feres Doctrine Should Not Have Barred the Plaintiff’s Claim
Courts should read the FTCA broadly to allow a wide range of plaintiffs
an opportunity for redress in federal district courts. 69 As stated in White v.
United States, courts must give the FTCA “liberal construction to ward off
the obvious evil, which the Act was passed to prevent.” 70 Courts do not

65. See Joyce v. M & M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Okla. 1983) (detailing
situations where an original actor should anticipate and protect against criminal conduct).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 448 (1965) (stating that the original
actor is generally not liable for the criminal acts of a third party, unless the actor knew or
should have known that his negligence created a situation where a third party had the
opportunity to commit such a crime).
66. See Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849, 854 (Okla. 1961) (finding that whether a
lapse of time qualifies as an intervening cause is a question of fact and, therefore, could
remove liability from the original actor). However, in this case, the passage of two-and-ahalf years between the construction of a roof and its collapse was not sufficient to break the
causal chain as the roof should have remained safe for a longer period of time. Id. at 85455. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. c (1965) (explaining that
although lapse in time is a factor, if the original negligence is still a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, then no lapse in time prevents the original actor from being liable).
67. See City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that the
original actor did not need to foresee that twenty-eight years after the light’s construction,
wires would fall and kill a specific person). It was enough that this type of accident was
foreseeable to the original actor. Id.
68. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1012-13 (D. Mass. 1996)
(explaining that the rape and murder of the plaintiff’s wife was proximately caused by the
Army’s negligent hiring of the perpetrator because without the hiring, the injury never could
have occurred). The direct connection between the hiring and the injury satisfies proximate
cause. Id.
69. See Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 1981) (indicating that
courts should not interpret the exceptions to the FTCA so as to virtually deny federal
employees recovery, as this is against the statute’s purpose, which is to provide recovery in
a wide range of situations).
70. 317 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1963) (quoting Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States,
193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951)) (stating that one purpose of the FTCA is to prevent the
unfairness of allowing the government to be immune from suits by federal employees in
situations where private employees would have redress).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/4

12

Reidy: Gonzales v. United States Air Force: Should Courts Consider Rape

2005]

GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

647

serve the purpose of the FTCA by narrowly construing its application. 71
Both the incredible expansion of the reach of the Feres Doctrine over
particular claims 72 and the majority interpretation of the assault and battery
exception frustrate the intended purpose of the FTCA. 73 Therefore, in
order for the FTCA to serve Congress’s intended purpose, courts should
limit the application of the Feres Doctrine to claims that directly question
military order and discipline. 74
As the Supreme Court initially created a distinction between injuries that
occurred incident to service and injuries that did not, courts should
continue to adhere to this distinction today. 75 Furthermore, Feres should
not bar tort claims, such as the one in Gonzalez, because the negligence
alleged did not arise out of the sexual assault but instead arose prior to the
injury itself. 76 Instead, the application of the Feres Doctrine should extend
only to injuries foreseeably arising out of service-related activities. 77 The
Feres Doctrine bars injuries caused by medical malpractice, malfunctioning
weapons, and even negligently driven vehicles, as these are all accidental

71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2005) (allowing for federal employees injured by other
employees acting in the scope of their employment to seek relief against the federal
government); see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25 (explaining that a purpose of the FTCA
was to provide relief for government employees who were injured in the course of their
employment due to the negligence of another federal employee in situations where private
employees would also have redress).
72. See Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing Persons, 925 F.2d at 296 n.7) (explaining
that courts have expanded Feres to bar almost every claim brought by an active duty service
member); see also Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 379 (Lucero, J., concurring) (arguing that the
scope of the Feres Doctrine has reached beyond its original limitations).
73. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54-55 (barring FTCA claims that allege that the
government was negligent in its hiring procedures because, although negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury, the claims stem from an assault or battery).
74. See, e.g., Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 694, 698-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
only prevailing rationale for barring claims for service-related injuries is that such claims
would question military order and discipline); Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431,
1436 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Johnson II] (stating that the strongest argument for the
Feres Doctrine is the need to protect military order and discipline from judicial
intervention).
75. Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52-53 (allowing the plaintiff’s claim because the
plaintiff’s injuries, which did not stem from direct military orders, did not occur incident to
service), with Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (barring the plaintiff’s claim and finding that when a
plaintiff is on active duty and obeying military orders, then the injuries occur incident to
service). The plain language of Feres evidences its distinction from Brooks, as the Supreme
Court in Feres found that there should be an “allowance of claims arising from noncombat
activities in peace,” based on the language of the FTCA. Id. at 138. But see Gonzalez, 88
Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (finding the plaintiff’s injuries incident to service where the plaintiff
was injured while on-base and on duty, despite the fact that she was not obeying direct
military orders or performing a military duty).
76. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (finding the negligence alleged in the
complaint irrelevant to the entire Feres analysis by focusing on the circumstances
surrounding the rape, not on the government’s negligence in hiring).
77. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (barring claims for injuries that arose incident to service
because they occurred while the plaintiff was under the compulsion of military orders).
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injuries that are foreseeable consequences of military service. 78 Although
rape does occur within the military, it should not be an injury that an
enlistee should consider foreseeable for purposes of the Feres analysis, as it
does not arise as a consequence of one’s military service. 79 Furthermore,
rape should not be considered an accident or a consequence of carrying out
one’s military commands or duties as it has no relation to other servicerelated activities. 80 Instead, rape is a severely punished crime within the
military. 81 A rape by a fellow service member should be unexpected based
on the duty of care owed to fellow service members that entails a promise
that a service member will not rape another, and instead, will do anything
in his or her power to protect others. 82
Furthermore, the factual pattern of Gonzalez is more akin to that of
Brooks rather than that of Feres because the plaintiff in Gonzalez was not
obeying military orders when the sexual assault occurred. 83 In the present
case, as in Brooks, there was no foreseeability that this rape could occur to

78. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (stating that examples of injuries that arise incident to
service are those such as decisions made by officers in battle, a mistake by a military
physician made during surgery, or a defective vehicle used in combat-related activities).
79. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (failing to discuss the foreseeability of the
occurrence of the plaintiff’s rape in the military); see also DEP’T OF DEF., TASK FORCE
REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 58 (2004) (explaining that in a study of
more than 3600 female veterans taken to a Veterans Administration facility between July
1994 and June 1995, twenty-three percent reported that they were sexually assaulted while
in
the
military),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/May2004/d20040513SATFReport.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005). The Report further
explains that due to differences in available studies and definitions, the comparison to
civilian figures is unavailable. Id.; see also Amy Herdy & Miles Moffeit, Betrayal in the
Ranks, DENVER POST, 2004, at 4 (explaining that a survey in recent years by the Department
of Veterans Affairs reported that nearly “[thirty] percent of women reported a rape or
attempted rape” in the military, while a 2000 federal study lists the civilian comparison as
“nearly
[eighteen]
percent”),
available
at
http://
www.ici.kent.edu/newsbooks/tdp_betrayal.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005).
80. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 379 (Lucero, J., concurring) (stating that no young
person, when enlisting for military service, could expect that injuries “incident to service”
potentially would include sexual assault). But see id. at 375 (finding that the sexual assault
occurred incident to service, as it occurred on-base, while the plaintiff was on duty, and
while she was receiving military benefits, despite there being no mention of military orders
or commands).
81. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 573 (approving the sentence of “dishonorable discharge,
confinement for [twenty] months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1
[grade level]” as a punishment for the crimes of rape, unlawful entry and fraudulent
enlistment). See generally 10 U.S.C.S. § 920 (2004) (indicating that the specified
punishments in the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the crime of rape range from death
to a mere reduction in grade level and demonstrating that rape is not tolerated within the
military).
82. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2004) (requiring all military members to perform their actions
under a standard of “good order and discipline”); United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 448
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating specifically that rape is against military policy because it has a
substantial impact on “good order” and “discipline”).
83. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (finding that Feres bars this sexual assault
claim because the plaintiff’s activities at the time of injury, drinking and impaired sleeping,
were recreational and occurred based on military orders and discipline).
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a person enlisted in the military, as one is supposed to feel safe while on
duty. 84 In Feres, the injuries that occurred were a foreseeable result of
being on active duty in the military. 85 Gonzalez demonstrates the
expansion of the Feres Doctrine to a point never intended by early case
law, since courts have virtually destroyed the judicially-created distinction
between Feres and Brooks. 86
As the relevant focus in Feres cases is the moment of negligence and not
the moment of the injury, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly analyzed
Gonzalez. 87 The Tenth Circuit ignored that the moment of negligence in
the plaintiff’s case occurred at a different point in time than the plaintiff’s
injury. 88 The negligence itself (the enlistment of Nazario) and the injury
(the rape) occurred at two distinct points in time. 89 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit should have analyzed the plaintiff’s claim in Gonzalez by focusing
on the time of the alleged negligence, as that is the relevant inquiry, and not
on the point when the injury occurred. 90
84. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (finding that there is a “vital distinction” between
Brooks and Feres because the plaintiff in Brooks was “under compulsion of no orders or
duty and on no military mission”). Arguably, as the plaintiff was not on active duty or
under orders, this demonstrated that the injury that occurred was not foreseeable in nature.
Id. But see Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (specifying that injuries that arise out of service are those
that occur as a result of the poor judgment of a commander in battle, a defective Jeep or a
surgeon’s slip). A service member potentially could foresee these types of injuries. Id.
85. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37 (deciding three consolidated cases: one case where
the decedent perished in a fire in the barracks when the military should have known the
heating elements to be unsafe and two medical malpractice cases alleging the negligence of
military doctors during various operations). In the first case, the defendant was under the
compulsion of direct military orders to remain quartered in his barracks when the fire
occurred. Id. In the other two cases, it was foreseeable that injuries could arise in medical
operations by physicians who lack the requisite training. Id.
86. Compare id. at 146 (finding that an injury arises incident to service when the
plaintiff is on duty and obeying direct military orders), and Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (holding
that the injuries the plaintiff received were not incident to service because they did not occur
while he was under compulsion of military orders; they occurred while he was on furlough),
with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (holding that the plaintiff’s rape was an injury incident
to service simply because it occurred while she was on active duty and on-base).
87. See Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir. 1981) (creating a
distinction between the alleged negligence that occurred prior to the plaintiff’s injuries and
the moment of the actual injury). The court then based the Feres analysis on the moment of
the negligence, rather then on the moment of the injury. Id.; see also Kendrick v. United
States, 877 F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the correct focus of Feres is not
when the injury occurs but rather on the circumstances surrounding the negligent act);
Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971) (arguing that courts should base
the Feres analysis on the negligence alleged rather than on the moment of injury because of
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Brown, which allowed a former service
member to recover because the negligence occurred after his discharge).
88. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374 (failing to acknowledge the plaintiff’s claim of
negligence as the appropriate focus in Feres cases).
89. See id. at 372-73 (explaining that the rape took place in July 1999); Nazario, 56
M.J. at 577 (stating that Nazario began the enlistment process in Fall 1998).
90. See Monaco, 661 F.2d at 133 (arguing that the appropriate analysis in a Feres case
should be based on the negligence alleged rather than on the injury that occurred). But see
Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (analyzing the plaintiff’s claim based on the injury she
received rather than focusing on the negligence alleged in the claim).
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In Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s four factors as
guides to determine whether Feres barred the plaintiff’s claim, thus
demonstrating a respect for the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis in this area of
case law. 91 In addressing the four factors, the Court failed to take into
account the actual negligence alleged by the plaintiff regarding the hiring
of Nazario. 92 The negligence alleged did not stem from the actual assault
and battery, but occurred prior to the plaintiff’s rape. 93 The analysis of the
Feres portion of the plaintiff’s case should have yielded a different
outcome because the alleged negligence arose prior to the assault;
therefore, the Tenth Circuit failed to analyze the claim properly. 94 The
following five sections will elaborate on each factor of the four-part test
and then discuss the prevailing concern behind the Feres Doctrine. 95
1. The Location of the Negligent Act
The Tenth Circuit erroneously interpreted the location of the injury to be
the relevant inquiry in Gonzalez because the focus in Feres cases is on the
negligence alleged, not the actual injury. 96 Therefore, as the negligent
conduct in Gonzalez was the failure of the military to perform an adequate
background check on Nazario, the location of the actual negligence is
unknown because it may not have occurred on-base. 97 Nevertheless, the
91. See 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (citing Dreier, 106 F.3d at 848) (stating that the Ninth
Circuit’s four factors determine whether the plaintiff’s injury was incident to service
through a balancing of the circumstances). The court further found that the injury was
incident to service, because it occurred pursuant to the plaintiff’s attendance at an on-base
party and was a direct result of her military status. Id.
92. See id. at 375 (determining that the Feres Doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim based
on the received injury and not the recruiter’s negligence). The plaintiff alleged, among
other things, that the military was negligent in its failure to perform an adequate background
check on Nazario at the time of his hiring. Id. at 373; see also Dreier, 106 F.3d at 848
(stating the four factors that courts tend to focus on in a Feres case).
93. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (explaining that the plaintiff alleged that the
military negligently enlisted Nazario). The court noted that the plaintiff’s rape occurred in
July 1999, which was, at most, nine months after Nazario’s enlistment. Id. at 372-73; see
also Henning, 446 F.2d at 777 (stating that the correct focus in a Feres analysis is on the
moment of negligence, not the moment of injury, because the negligence is the basis of the
claim).
94. See Kendrick, 877 F.2d at 1203 (noting that the relevant focus in the Feres analysis
is the moment of negligence, not the moment of injury). But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at
375 (ignoring the relevant inquiry in the Feres analysis, the negligence alleged, and instead
focusing erroneously on the injury that the plaintiff received).
95. See infra Parts II.A.1-II.B (analyzing the four-part test by focusing on the
negligence alleged in the complaint, rather then on the plaintiff’s injury and discussing the
reasoning behind the need to protect military order and discipline).
96. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (failing to focus the guideposts from Dreier
on the actual claim of the plaintiff and instead focusing the analysis on the moment of
injury); see also Monaco, 661 F.3d at 133 (stating that courts should focus on the negligence
alleged and not the moment of the injury).
97. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (failing to state where the enlistment of Nazario took
place). The court noted that it was Nazario who initially contacted the recruiter about his
enlistment. Id. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (finding that the location of the
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location alone is not dispositive and the court must consider it in
conjunction with the other Feres factors. 98 In some cases, courts have
allowed recovery where the negligence occurred on a military base and, in
other cases, denied recovery when the negligence occurred off-base. 99 In
either instance, however, this factor cannot weigh heavily in the overall
analysis because of the unknown location of the negligent act and,
therefore, the court must consider this factor relative to the other
circumstances in this case. 100
2. The Status of the Plaintiff at the Time of the Negligent Hiring
The negligence that the plaintiff in Gonzalez alleged may have occurred
prior to her entry into the military. 101 However, as the relevant focus of the
Feres inquiry is the moment of the negligence, the unknown status of the
plaintiff at the time of the military’s negligence cannot provide any
guidance. 102 If the plaintiff had not enlisted yet, none of her claims of
negligence could involve military decisions. 103
Even if the plaintiff was on active duty at the time of the government’s
negligence, the status of the plaintiff is not highly relevant to the Feres
analysis because it does not demonstrate any relationship between the
rape was on-base, and therefore, this was the relevant inquiry). The Tenth Circuit failed to
state whether the enlistment of Nazario took place on a military site. Id.
98. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1437 (stating that even when an injury occurs on-base,
the court must analyze the actions that the active duty service member was performing at the
time of the injury). The location of the incident, alone, does not decide the case. Id.; see
also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that although
Brooks permits recovery if the injury occurred off-base, the converse is not always true). If
the injury to the plaintiff occurred on-base, the proper focus is to examine the nature of the
service member’s function in performing the activity at issue—whether the activity was an
order or a duty. Id.
99. See Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1072 n.24 (11th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that various courts have allowed recovery regardless of where the location of the
negligent act occurred because they have considered the location prong in combination with
the service member’s activity); see, e.g., Elliot ex. rel. Elliot v. United States, 877 F. Supp.
1569, 1576 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (permitting recovery in a case where on-base carbon monoxide
poisoning occurred).
100. See Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1095 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
although the location of the act, if known, is important, it does not control the Feres analysis
and, even if the location is definitely a military site, this does not automatically bar recovery
under Feres); see also Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1437 (stating that the location of the
negligence is not dispositive in the Feres analysis because courts must balance all relevant
factors).
101. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (stating that at the time of the injury, the
plaintiff was an active duty service member, but failing to mention the status of the plaintiff
at the time of the military’s negligence in enlisting Nazario).
102. See Kendrick, 877 F.2d at 1203 (indicating that the proper focus should be on the
time of the negligence, not the time of the injury, assuming that the negligence and the
injury were not simultaneous). But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (failing to question
what the military status of the plaintiff was at the time of Nazario’s enlistment).
103. See Monaco, 661 F.2d at 132 (noting that if plaintiffs are not on active duty or
enlisted in the military at the time of the negligence, then Feres cannot bar the claims
because there is no need to protect military order and discipline).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

17

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4

652

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:3

negligence and the plaintiff’s military service. 104 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit should not have interpreted the plaintiff’s claim to mean that but for
her status as a military member, Nazario would never have raped her,
because this is not the relevant inquiry. 105 Therefore, as the status of the
plaintiff at the time of the negligence is unknown and unpersuasive, it
cannot weigh heavily towards barring the plaintiff’s claim. 106
3. The Benefits the Plaintiff Received Due to Her Military Status
The Tenth Circuit improperly analyzed the plaintiff’s military service in
the overall Feres analysis. 107 The negligent act of hiring Nazario occurred
prior to the moment the plaintiff in Gonzalez sustained her injury. 108
Therefore, any benefits received by the plaintiff during her military service
are irrelevant to the overall Feres analysis. 109 There is no relation between
the time of the negligent hiring of Nazario, and the minimal benefits
received by the plaintiff at the time of her injury. 110
The Tenth Circuit found that the benefit the plaintiff received at the time
of her injury was her ability to attend an on-base military party. 111 Courts
have found that injuries that occur during recreational activities are incident
to service because they relate to military order and discipline. 112 However,
the plaintiff’s ability to attend an on-base party is not a direct consequence
of her military status, because other civilians could attend this party, and
therefore, the factor cannot weigh heavily in the overall Feres analysis. 113
104. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438 (stating that the plaintiff’s military status was only
relevant in the Feres analysis insofar as the status demonstrated any relationship between
the government’s negligent act or omission and the plaintiff’s military service).
105. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1011 (indicating that courts should not interpret “incident to
service” to mean “but for the individual’s military service, the injury would not have
occurred,” because courts must do an independent analysis of all the factors to determine
whether Feres bars the claim).
106. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438 (explaining that this factor is only relevant insofar
as it demonstrates a relation between the negligence and the plaintiff’s military status).
107. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (using the fact that the plaintiff was at an onbase party to demonstrate that the benefits she received flowed directly from her military
status and, therefore, barred the claim).
108. See id. at 372-73 (indicating that the rape occurred in July 1999); Nazario, 56 M.J.
at 577 (stating that Nazario’s enlistment process began several months prior to the rape, in
Fall 1998).
109. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (implying that the benefit the plaintiff received
was the ability to attend an on-base party with other civilians).
110. See id. at 375-76 (failing to explain the relevance between the plaintiff’s benefit, the
ability to attend the party, and the negligence on the part of the military in enlisting
Nazario).
111. See id. at 376 (arguing that the ability to attend an on-base party was a direct
consequence of the plaintiff’s military service).
112. See Costo, 248 F.3d at 868-69 (indicating that most recreational activities that are
military-sponsored fall under the Feres bar because these activities reinforce good morale,
order and discipline within the military and, thus, serve a military purpose).
113. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438-39 (explaining that if the benefit received by the
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Furthermore, because there is no articulable tie between the military’s
negligent hiring and the benefits received by the plaintiff as a result of
being in the military, the focus on the status of the plaintiff at the time of
the negligent act is irrelevant to the overall Feres analysis. 114
4. The Nature of the Plaintiff’s Activities at the Time of the Negligent Act
Although the nature of the plaintiff’s activities at the time of the
negligent act weighs heavily in the overall analysis, 115 this final factor is
unknown and, therefore, not determinative of whether Feres bars the
plaintiff’s claim. 116 The plaintiff’s activities at the time of injury indicate
that she was not subject directly to military discipline, nor was she acting
under orders or performing any duty. 117 At the time of the actual assault,
which should not be relevant to the court’s analysis, the plaintiff’s activity
was not service-related because another service member raped her while
she was “sleeping in an impaired state.” 118 The sexual activity at the
moment of injury “served no military purpose,” nor was it related to any
military purpose. 119
Furthermore, similar to the plaintiff in Brooks, the court should not have
plaintiff is indistinguishable from other benefits that a civilian could receive, then the
benefit is not a direct consequence of being in the military). The Court found that that the
plaintiff’s part-time, after-hours employment in a military club was not distinguishable from
any other part-time employment unrelated to military duties. Id. at 1439.
114. See Holman v. United States, No. 91-15012, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13588, at *8,
11 (9th Cir. June 5, 1992) (mem.) (stating that the benefits the plaintiff received are only
relevant to explain the plaintiff’s presence at the military site and do not outweigh any other
factor, such as participating in conduct regulated by the military, in the overall analysis).
But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (focusing erroneously on the moment of injury
and stating that the benefit received by the plaintiff was the ability to attend an on-base party
that civilians also attended).
115. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1439 (stating that the nature of the plaintiff’s activities
at the time of the negligent act is the most relevant factor in the overall Feres analysis to
determine whether this claim would question military orders and discipline).
116. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 372-73 (focusing incorrectly on the moment of the
plaintiff’s injury rather than the moment of negligence and, therefore, failing to explain the
activities of the plaintiff at the time of Nazario’s enlistment).
117. Cf. Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir. 1980) (arguing that although
a court could consider virtually every part of a service member’s life incident to service,
there are situations where the plaintiff’s injury does not relate to his military duties).
Compare Day v. Massachusetts Air Nat’l Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 683 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding
that this factor weighed in the plaintiff’s favor under Feres, as he was asleep at the time of
his sexual assault), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (explaining that the plaintiff was
under military orders and discipline, despite being asleep at the time of her injury).
118. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (arguing that although the plaintiff was not
awake at the time of her injury, courts have found that the Feres Doctrine bars recreational
activities, to which sleep can be analogized, despite the plaintiff being under no actual
military control).
119. See Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that sexual
harassment does not serve a specific military purpose). The court in Stubbs balanced this
factor against two others, the duty status of the plaintiff at the moment of injury (obeying
military orders to clean the latrines) and the location of the injury (on-base), and ultimately
barred the plaintiff’s claim under the Feres Doctrine. Id.
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found that the plaintiff in Gonzalez was, at the time of her rape, obeying
direct military orders or performing any activity related to her military
career. 120 Instead, she was sleeping, “in an impaired state,” much the same
as any person would after a party where he or she possibly had too much to
drink. 121 Sleep, regardless of whether someone is in an impaired state, is
not an activity that someone performs under the compulsion of military
orders. 122 Therefore, the sleeping plaintiff in Gonzalez closely resembles
the furloughed plaintiff in Brooks, who also was not subject to military
orders at the time of his injury. 123
Although the plaintiff’s injuries occurred on-base while the plaintiff was
on active duty and subject to military discipline, the negligent act did not
occur at this same moment and, therefore, the court’s analysis is flawed
because it should have focused on the moment of negligence, not the
moment of injury. 124 Balancing the sexual assault, which has no military
purpose, against the plaintiff’s activities, status, and location at the time of
the negligent act, which were all unknown, demonstrates that Feres should
not have barred the plaintiff’s claim. 125 Furthermore, allowing the
plaintiff’s claim to proceed on the merits would only serve to support the
disciplinary structure within the military, which is the very rationale behind
the Feres Doctrine, as it likely would make the military more trustworthy
120. Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (finding that the injury received by the plaintiff
had nothing to do with his military career or military orders because he was on furlough
and, therefore, was not incident to service), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375
(demonstrating that the plaintiff received her injury while she was on-base, however, she
was drunk and sleeping at the time of her rape).
121. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (finding that although the plaintiff was not
furthering a military objective when she slept, she still was subjected to military discipline
at that time).
122. See Day, 167 F.3d at 683 (barring the plaintiff’s assault claim under Feres,
however, specifically stating that the fact that the plaintiff was asleep, and therefore, not on
duty, at the time of injury weighed in his favor). But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76
(disregarding the fact that the plaintiff actually was asleep on-base in her own barracks
when the injury occurred, and instead finding that she was still subject to military orders and
discipline when the rape occurred).
123. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (finding that Feres differed from Brooks, as the plaintiff
in the latter was on furlough at the time of his injury and was not under military orders at the
time). But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (arguing that the military subjected the
plaintiff to orders while she was both asleep and intoxicated).
124. Compare Monaco, 661 F.2d at 133 (indicating that as long as the negligence occurs
at a time that the plaintiff is not in the military service, even if the injury does, the Feres
Doctrine does not bar the plaintiff’s claim), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (barring
the plaintiff’s claim under Feres because it analyzed the claim based on the moment of
injury, which occurred during the plaintiff’s service, not on the negligence, which possibly
occurred prior to her time in the service).
125. Compare Dreier, 106 F.3d at 852-53 (holding that the Feres Doctrine did not bar
the plaintiff’s claim because, at the time of his death, the plaintiff was (1) indistinguishable
from a civilian; (2) on-base; (3) not receiving any benefits that were military related; and (4)
taking part in activities that were not military related), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375
(finding that the Feres Doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim because, at the time of injury,
the plaintiff was: (1) an active duty military member; (2) on-base; (3) receiving military
benefits; and (4) taking part in military-related activities).
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in the eyes of a service member because he or she would know that there is
an outside check on the actions of those in the service. 126
B. The Protection of Military Order and Discipline
The prevailing judicial concern in allowing the Feres Doctrine to bar
cases is the protection of military order and discipline. 127 Under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, any service member “who believes
himself wronged” may bring to the attention of a commanding officer any
injury that may have occurred. 128 If the commanding officer refuses to
offer any redress, then the service member can complain to any superior
officer. 129 However, this does not necessarily solve the problem in cases
that allege serious accusations, such as sexual assault or sexual
harassment. 130 For example, the superior could potentially be the aggressor
in the situation, thereby leaving the plaintiff without anyone independent of
the situation to hear her claim. 131 In addition, the perpetrator could deny
the accusations, or attempt to cover them up, rendering it a “he-said, shesaid” argument, which further could destroy any order within the
military. 132
If civilian courts were to address claims that alleged injuries based on
sexual assault, this would only help to promote military order, rather than
126. See Dreier, 106 F.3d at 849 (stating that the most relevant question is whether
adjudication of this type of claim would have negative effects on the disciplinary system
within the military). See generally Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and
the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 78 n.527 (2003) (arguing that the protection of military order and discipline can
only occur when civilian courts review military policies since rape, itself, is against
discipline and order within the military).
127. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691-92 (stating that if the litigation of certain claims
would disturb the order and disciplinary structure within the military, courts should not hear
the specific claim under the Feres Doctrine).
128. See 10 U.S.C. § 938 art. 138 (2004) (protecting service members with the right of
review within the military in order to avoid any arbitrary or harmful decisions).
129. See id. (indicating that once the service members complain to any superior officer,
it is the superior officer’s duty to forward the complaint to the officer in charge of courtmartials, who, in turn, will evaluate the claim and take the proper measures).
130. See, e.g., Shiver v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (finding
that the plaintiff’s drill sergeant was the one who allegedly raped her); Corey v. United
States, No. 96-6409, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997)
(stating that after the plaintiff’s Colonel repeatedly sexually harassed her, she filed a
complaint within the military). However, this incident was covered up, threats were made
to potential witnesses, and the Air Force did not take disciplinary action against the harasser.
Id.; Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 59 (indicating that after the sergeant sexually harassed the plaintiff,
the plaintiff told her sister that if she complained to her superior officer as directed by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, “the Army would turn on her as a troublemaker”).
131. See, e.g., Shiver, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (explaining that the perpetrator was an
officer with a position of authority); Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 59 (demonstrating that the
aggressor was the plaintiff’s superior officer).
132. See, e.g., Corey, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (indicating that other
officers attempted to cover up the situation, leaving the plaintiff to defend herself, and
leaving her claim without any other support).
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interfere with it. 133 A situation that leaves a plaintiff in the military without
a remedy or the ability to bring suit against her aggressor who is also in the
service will serve to erode military order. 134 It is unlikely that an
individual would want to work to benefit a system that refuses to help her
or turns a blind eye to her situation. 135 The harm that could result from
judicial interference is far less costly than the harm and morale drain that
could result from the failure to address the injury at all. 136 The ability of
the judicial branch to question the military in these situations allows
military members, particularly women, to feel secure in their positions by
knowing that if a rape occurred, they could have a remedy in civilian
courts. 137 The advancement of military order and discipline is enhanced by
allowing potential plaintiffs the knowledge that independent judicial
systems will properly address and potentially remedy their injuries. 138 The
military cannot afford to allow a situation to occur where there is so much
distrust and secrecy as to cause a commanding officer to lack respect or

133. See Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time
for a Change of Forum?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 359-60 (1999) (arguing that the internal
investigations of the instances of sexual harassment and assault at both Tailhook and
Aberdeen Proving Ground interfered so much with military order and discipline that
litigating sexual assault and harassment cases only could help the situation within the
military, not harm it). But see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1983)
(explaining that the “special status” of the military requires a justice system specifically for
the military, separate from the civilian court system).
134. See Turley, supra note 126, at 78 n.527 (explaining that the protection of discipline
does not take place where a court does not review military policies because allowing sexual
assault to occur without any questioning is actually contrary to discipline and order). But
see Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 (finding that the special relationship between a soldier and his
superiors would not allow a lower ranked soldier to question or to hold his superior liable,
because this questioning potentially would destroy military order and discipline).
135. See Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 60-61 (explaining that the reason the victim committed
suicide was because she felt as if the military would do nothing to support her claim of
sexual harassment against her commanding officer, but rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that
the military “created the atmosphere which ultimately led to [the plaintiff’s] suicide”).
136. See Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that the
tolerance of rape and sexual harassment within the military “results in a warping of military
discipline, a lack of military readiness, and a weakening of national security”). But see
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04 (emphasizing that judicial interference in the military would
undermine the hierarchy that the military has established, thus destroying any discipline that
the military has created).
137. But see Mazur, supra note 5, at 718 n.103 (indicating that the purpose of barring
sexual harassment and assault claims under Feres is because litigation is not effective
discipline for those within the military). However, the military justice system apparently
does not provide effective discipline either, based on the high number of rapes and potential
rapes that women face. Herdy & Moffeit, supra note 79, at 4.
138. See Spak & Tomes, supra note 133, at 363 n.153 (indicating that although Feres
bars judicial intrusion in claims against the military in an attempt to promote military
discipline, this premise does not likely hold true in claims that allege sexual assault).
Questioning the decisions of those who commit sexual assault cannot undermine control, as
the perpetrators likely would not have any control or authority left to question. Id. But see
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04 (indicating that the military is not democratic and, therefore,
does not allow for civilian interference with the disciplinary structure of the military).
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credibility. 139 Although the Supreme Court designed Feres to protect the
military from judicial intervention, 140 the Court also judicially created the
Doctrine to prevent the chaos that might ensue from a situation where
service members question the orders and commands of superior officers. 141
The refusal of courts to hear such claims only fosters the very situations
that the Supreme Court intended Feres to prevent, because without judicial
questioning, obedience and loyalty within the military could result in
distrust and insubordination. 142
C. The Discretionary Function Exception Should not Bar
the Plaintiff’s Claim Because the Negligence was not
at the Planning Level
The discretionary function exception should not have barred the
plaintiff’s claim in Gonzalez, because the decision made by the recruiter
was not one of a discretionary nature. 143 Decisions at the planning level
focus on the type of person to admit into the military, while decisions at the
operational level focus on the decision to admit a specific person into the
military. 144 The actual enlistment of a person into the military occurs at the
operational level; therefore, the discretionary function exception does not
apply. 145 Therefore, since a military regulation bound the recruiter in
Gonzalez to perform a background check accurately and the recruiter failed
in this duty, the decision to enlist Nazario occurred at the operational

139. See, e.g., Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 60-61 (demonstrating that where a commanding
officer sexually harassed a subordinate, the victim committed suicide because she felt that
other officers would not believe that he assaulted her).
140. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 690-91 (finding that the protection against judicial
intervention into military decisions was a reason behind the Feres Doctrine). Courts attempt
to protect these decisions, since they closely relate to the ability to complete military
missions. Id.
141. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44 (protecting the unique relationship between the
soldier and the soldier’s superiors).
142. See Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1396 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that courts
can grant review when the plaintiff’s claim is relatively serious and the potential injury to
the plaintiff greatly outweighs any interference that judicial questioning might have with
military decisions). But see Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691 (arguing that obedience and loyalty
within the military are promoted by not allowing courts to question military decisions).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005) (indicating that the government cannot be liable for
claims based on the discretion of federal employees at the planning level); see also Bryson,
463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (clarifying how acts, such as the ones in Gonzalez, occurred not at
the planning level but at the operational level, and thus the discretionary function
presumptively does not apply).
144. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (explaining that the standards to judge whether
an applicant is qualified for the military are developed at a planning level, thus exempting
the government from liability as to the content of those standards). However, the actual
application of the standards takes place at the operational level, permitting courts to hold the
government liable. Id.
145. See id. at 912 (finding that the operational level consists of any action on the part of
a federal employee that takes and applies the plans and judgments to individual cases).
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level. 146 The recruiter’s actions were not at the planning level because he
was not making any overall policy judgments, so the discretionary function
exception does not apply. 147
As Congress’s intended purpose of this exception was to prevent judicial
interference in military decision-making, this exception is not applicable in
the case at hand because the decision by the recruiter was not discretionary;
rather, it was a failure to follow prescribed regulations. 148 Congress
effectively would be endorsing a policy of admitting convicted felons into
the military if it did not allow judicial questioning of decisions made by
recruiters while violating prescribed regulations. 149 The decision to admit
one person into the military who happens to be a prior convicted felon is
not the type of decision Congress intended to shield from judicial scrutiny
under the discretionary function exception. 150 Judicial interference in a
situation similar to Gonzalez would protect the safety and security of the
military because these factors cannot exist if enlistees are prior convicted
felons. 151 More importantly, the military cannot function properly if it
exists conditioned upon a system of mistrust and fear.
D. The Tenth Circuit Should Adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
Position on Negligent Hiring Because Doing So Would
Better Serve the Purpose Behind the FTCA
The appropriate analysis of negligent hiring claims is the framework
used by the Ninth Circuit in Senger as opposed to that of the Shearer

146. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that the recruiter failed to determine
what was enclosed within Nazario’s sealed records); see also 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005)
(requiring that the military perform a background check on all military applicants, and
noting that a felony charge bars enlistment).
147. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (stating that the enlistment of a specific
individual into the military is at the operational level because it entails putting policy into
effect and does not require the use of judgment on the part of the recruiter; instead, the
planning level requires the use of judgment); see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (finding
that the relevant inquiry that guides the analysis is the nature of the employee’s conduct, not
the status of the employee). The Court further stated that if there were a statute, regulation
or policy that mandated the actions of the employee, it would not be discretionary because
there would not be the element of choice involved. Id.
148. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter attempted to determine the
truthfulness of Nazario’s statements as regulations bound him to do so); see also Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814 (indicating that the purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial
questioning in certain types of decisions that Congress intended to shield from liability).
149. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (subjecting the government to liability where a
recruiter does not follow the prescribed instructions regarding the enlistment of a specific
person into the military, since planning level decisions are not those that Congress intended
to shield from liability).
150. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (finding that the purpose of
the discretionary function exception is to protect against suits that would prevent efficiency
in governmental operations).
151. But see id. (stating that governmental agencies, such as the military, must be able to
run efficiently without judicial interference and questioning).
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plurality. 152 The framework the Tenth Circuit used, that of the Shearer
plurality, is erroneous because it does not follow the procedure dictated by
the FTCA. 153 Since the meaning behind the FTCA is to allow a broad class
of persons the ability to seek redress against the federal government for
negligence, courts should not grant broad immunity. 154 Instead, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a similar case in order to resolve
the discrepancies among circuits, and should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
position on negligent hiring because doing so would better serve the
purpose behind the FTCA. 155
While Shearer and Gonzalez have some similarities, the circumstances
surrounding the injury in Shearer are quite different from those of
Gonzalez. 156 On the other hand, the facts of Senger and Gonzalez are quite
similar, as both cases demonstrate negligence on the part of the government
regarding its hiring and retention procedures. 157 The plaintiff’s complaint
in Gonzalez should have focused on the failure of the military to complete
its duty of ensuring that prior convicted felons do not enlist in the military,
and this should have been the specific focus of the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis. 158 The facts surrounding Gonzalez demonstrate that it is truly a
case of negligence arising prior to military service, similar to Senger, in

152. Compare Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442 (arguing that the intentional tort exception does
not bar negligent hiring claims when the claims themselves do not arise directly from the
assault and battery, and instead arise out of the government’s negligence in hiring), with
Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (deciding that the intentional tort exception bars any claim that
would not exist without the prior occurrence of an assault and battery and, therefore, barring
negligent hiring claims).
153. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (holding, in a plurality opinion, that the intentional tort
exception of the FTCA bars claims alleging that the government was negligent in failing to
prevent the assault or battery of an active duty service member); Franklin, 992 F.2d at 1498
(finding that the Tenth Circuit adopted the Shearer plurality opinion and, therefore, the
intentional tort exception bars negligence claims because the claims stemmed from an
assault or battery).
154. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (explaining that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide
broad redress for plaintiffs).
155. See id. at 1441-42 (holding that the intentional tort exception should not bar
negligent hiring claims because one purpose of the FTCA is to provide an avenue of redress
for federal employees in situations where private employees have the ability to gain relief).
156. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 52 (addressing a complaint that alleged that the
military was negligent in its supervision of the perpetrator because he committed his assault
subsequent to his enlistment), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (explaining that Nazario
had committed his crime prior to his enlistment into the military, thereby fraudulently
enlisting).
157. Compare Senger, 103 F.3d at 1444 (explaining that the post office may have failed
in its duty to third parties because the plaintiff’s assault should been foreseeable to the
perpetrator’s employer as it knew of his long history of violence and instability), with
Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (indicating that the plaintiff did not focus her complaint
directly on the negligence in the hiring of Nazario but, instead, had numerous negligence
claims against the military).
158. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim alleged
various FTCA arguments, without specifically focusing on one major claim, and then
barring the claim under Feres without addressing any of the plaintiff’s arguments).
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which the post office had knowledge of the prior instabilities in the
perpetrator’s life, rather than just a case of a mere failure to supervise. 159
Furthermore, the failure to supervise in Shearer occurred at the same
moment as the injury, while the negligence in Gonzalez occurred prior to
the injury, at the time of Nazario’s enlistment. 160 Unlike Shearer, where
the military did not have the ability to know of the perpetrator’s dangerous
tendencies upon his enlistment, in Senger, the postal service knew of the
perpetrator’s violent history. 161 The military, in Gonzalez, should have
known of Nazario’s prior assault conviction due to its enlistment
regulations and, therefore, demonstrated negligence in its failure to follow
its own procedures. 162 The military could have prevented Nazario’s actions
by rejecting his application prior to his enlistment, just as the post office
could have prevented Senger’s assault had it taken the recommended action
to remove the perpetrator from his job. 163
Although a majority of circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have
adopted the concept that the assault and battery exception bars claims
focusing on negligence in hiring, courts should not adopt the majority
viewpoint in cases like Gonzalez. 164 The Supreme Court still has not
159. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that Nazario fraudulently enlisted into
the military, thereby showing that the negligence on the part of the military occurred prior to
Nazario’s actual enlistment).
160. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (stating that the plaintiff alleged that the military
failed to supervise the perpetrator, by enabling him to commit such a violent crime), with
Senger, 103 F.3d at 1440 (explaining that the post office had knowledge of the perpetrator’s
previous criminal acts, dangerous tendencies, and violent past, and even proposed that it
remove him from his job many years prior to the actual assault), and Nazario, 56 M.J. at
577 (demonstrating that the military failed in its duty to protect other service members by
incorrectly following the military regulations regarding criminal background checks).
161. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (stating that the prior manslaughter conviction
occurred at another Army base, and failing to mention whether the perpetrator had
committed any violent felonies prior to his enlistment), with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442
(explaining that the perpetrator’s employer had knowledge of the his criminal history and
stated that one of his criminal acts took place while he was working with the post office).
162. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (forbidding any person who has a felony on his record
to enlist in the military); Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter had the ability to
run an accurate background check on Nazario, rather than merely make one phone call
without any follow-up).
163. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter failed to complete the
background check on Nazario and uncover the felony assault and, therefore, failed to
determine the accuracy of Nazario’s statements regarding his criminal history); see also
Senger, 103 F.3d at 1444 (stating that the court should hear the plaintiff’s claim on its merits
because summary judgment was inappropriate where the injury to the plaintiff may have
been foreseeable based on the knowledge the post office had at the time).
164. Compare Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
§ 2680(h) bars all claims that rely on an existing assault or battery), and Hoot v. United
States, 790 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the intentional tort exception barred
the plaintiff’s claims for negligence because the claims arose from an assault or battery),
with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1440-41 (stating that there is federal subject matter jurisdiction
when a claim arises from negligence in the hiring or supervision of employees because the
intentional tort exception does not bar such claims since the negligence, as opposed to the
injuries, does not arise directly out of the assault or battery).
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directly refuted the position of the Ninth Circuit, so it still stands as valid
law, and the Tenth Circuit should adopt the minority viewpoint as a way to
analyze negligent hiring claims. 165 The viewpoint of the Ninth Circuit
regarding negligent hiring better satisfies the legislative purpose behind the
FTCA. 166 In Gonzalez, the lack of an adequate background check was a
negligent omission on the part of the military that the court should not have
ignored. 167 Although the military does have in place regulations to
determine which candidates for enlistment have the proclivity to commit
violent crimes, 168 this system has not always proven reliable. 169
E. The Military Has an Affirmative Duty to Protect Service Members from
Potentially Dangerous Individuals
The military, just like any other employer, owes a duty to its employees
to hire only those persons who will not cause injury to other employees. 170
Military regulations ensure that no foreseeably dangerous individuals have
165. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (providing a framework used for analyzing negligent
hiring claims that is more consistent with the purpose of the FTCA in that it allows courts to
hear a broad range of negligence claims against the federal government); see also Jack W.
Massey, A Proposal to Narrow the Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1621, 1622 (2004) (stating that the minority viewpoint is
actually the better viewpoint to handle negligent hiring claims because it furthers the
purpose of the FTCA).
166. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (stating that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide
plaintiffs broad redress, if private citizens are also able to bring claims in similar situations).
167. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374 (leaving the victim without a remedy by
dismissing her claim in federal court under the Feres Doctrine).
168. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (indicating that among those persons not qualified to serve in
the armed forces are those with prior felony convictions, as these persons have the
inclination to commit criminal acts); 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005) (authorizing the military to
acquire the criminal histories of those applying to enlist to determine whether they have
committed felonies in the past); see also UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RECRUITING
PROCEDURES FOR THE AIR FORCE, AETC INSTRUCTION 36-2002 77-82 (Apr. 18, 2000)
(enumerating the offenses, such as assault, that may bar enlistment into the military, based
on the reasoning that those who have previously committed criminal acts have the ability to
do
so
again
in
the
future),
available
at
http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/im/pub/afpdl/publications/aetcpubs/aetcins/aetci362002.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005).
169. See, e.g., Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that the recruiter failed to
determine the accuracy of Nazario’s statements and uncover the felony assault on his
record). As the recruiter enlisted Nazario into the military, he breached his duty to protect
the other enlisted members from foreseeably dangerous individuals. Id.; see also Richard A.
Oppel, Jr. & Ariel Hart, Contractor Indicted in Afghan Detainee’s Beating, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2004, at A1 (explaining that a court recently indicted a civilian contractor, who
police had arrested fourteen years prior on felony assault charges, for “kicking and beating”
a detainee in Iraq). Despite his previous assault charges, the military had placed him at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, as a member of the Special Forces in the Army. Id.
170. See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 403 (holding that the military has a duty to prevent a
foreseeably dangerous individual from doing anything unattended); King v. United States,
756 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (indicating that in negligence claims, the first
thing that a plaintiff must demonstrate is a pre-existing duty to protect a group of people
from harm). See generally RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 314B(2) (1965) (indicating
that an employer owes a duty to protect its employees who foreseeably may be injured while
acting within the scope of their employment).
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the ability to enlist. 171 The mere existence of such procedures further
demonstrates the military’s acknowledgement of its duty to protect those
who have enlisted in the armed forces. 172 Therefore, the Air Force owed a
duty to Gonzalez, among others, to protect her from harm, and should have
rejected Nazario prior to his enlistment because he had a prior felony
assault conviction. 173
As regulations bound the recruiter to complete an accurate background
check on all potential enlistees, the military failed in its duty to protect
those enlisted in the military in the present case. 174 Although Nazario
stated that he had a juvenile charge for fighting, this was false, and the
recruiter should have taken the time to determine that Nazario actually had
a felony assault charge on his record. 175 Therefore, the failure to fulfill this
duty gave rise to the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the military. 176
The foreseeability of an injurious act is a prerequisite to holding the
government liable under the proximate cause requirement of a negligence
claim. 177 The Air Force knew that an injury (yet not specifically rape)
might be possible if it enlisted a person with a criminal record. 178 In fact,
the military has regulations in place to prevent this potentially dangerous
situation from occurring. 179 Although the Air Force could not be certain
171. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (stating that no person who has previously committed a felony
is qualified to enlist in the military); 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (requiring the military to complete
criminal history background checks to ensure the moral quality of all applicants and to bar
those with criminal records from enlisting).
172. See Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1008-09 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating
that the military had a duty not to enlist a prior convicted felon, as it should have known of
his dangerous propensities and because the military had a duty to protect service members
and their families from harm). See generally 32 C.F.R. § 96.4 (2004) (indicating that
regulations require the military to complete accurate background checks on potential
enlistees).
173. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1008-09 (finding that the military should not enlist
foreseeably dangerous persons because it has a duty to protect those within the military from
harm); see also 10 U.S.C. § 504 (denying enlistment to those with prior felonies on their
records unless they are specifically waived).
174. See Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031-32 (finding that if the military assumes a duty, this
duty binds the military to act with appropriate care so as to ensure the safety of the
individuals it is protecting).
175. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that although Nazario disclosed to the
recruiter that he had a juvenile conviction for fighting, the recruiter failed to determine the
accuracy of these statements because he did not investigate the contents of the sealed
record).
176. See Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031-32 (finding that because the military failed to
provide escorts guaranteed to females visiting the West Point Campus, the military was
liable for its negligence because its breach directly caused the injury to the plaintiffs).
177. See King, 756 F. Supp. at 1360 (arguing that if the military could foresee the danger
of its actions, yet still took these actions, and an injury occurred, then the behavior is a tort,
and a court potentially could hold the military liable for its actions).
178. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1010-11 (explaining that it is foreseeable when
enlisting a person with a criminal record into the military that this person potentially could
harm those with whom he comes into contact).
179. See 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005) (requiring the military to perform background checks
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that the past commission of a crime is dispositive of the propensity to
commit future crimes, the regulations act in a preemptive manner to
attempt to preclude the occurrence of any preventable injury with the goal
of ensuring the safety of others in the military. 180 The military does not
have to foresee the actual rape, just that there is the chance that a similar
injury may occur if it enlists a person with dangerous propensities. 181 The
injury the plaintiff in Gonzalez suffered was a potentially foreseeable result
of the hiring of a person who had a felony assault on his record. 182
Since there must be an unbroken chain of causation between the
negligence alleged and the injury for the government to be liable, it is
necessary to demonstrate that neither Nazario’s criminal act nor the lapse in
time qualify as supervening acts that break this chain. 183 In Gonzalez, the
plaintiff’s rape likely would not have occurred but for the government’s
original negligence in the hiring of Nazario. 184 Although the rape itself
caused the plaintiff’s injury, this act was foreseeable based on the
government’s original negligence under the third prong of the test, and
therefore does not qualify as a supervening event. 185 In addition, there was
on potential enlistees in order to prevent the enlistment of those with a felony on their
record).
180. See Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1304.26: Qualification Standards for Enlistment,
Appointment, and Induction, at 8 (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Directive 1304.26] (stating
that the purposes of these regulations are to minimize the enlistment of those who will
disrupt “good order, morale, and discipline,” and to ensure that the military does not place
those already enlisted in close contact with persons who have committed serious crimes in
order
to
protect
their
safety),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d130426wch1_122193/d130426p. pdf (last
visited June 1, 2005).
181. See King, 756 F. Supp. at 1360 (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal.
1986)) (stating that the military had no duty to foresee that the plaintiff’s husband would
commit suicide after the plaintiff’s arrest; however, the military should have foreseen that
the possibility existed for the plaintiff to harm herself). The court stated that its task was to
decide whether the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable harm from the negligence that
occurred. Id. at 1360 n.3.
182. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. 1009-10 (stating that the military has procedures meant to
ensure that it does not place prior convicted felons into positions of trust, as it is foreseeable
that these persons will harm those with whom they come into contact). See generally 10
U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (barring the enlistment of all persons who have a prior felony on their
record).
183. See Thompson, 652 P.2d at 263-64 (explaining that in order to successfully bring a
negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove that the negligence was the proximate cause of
the harm, and stating that the intervention of new forces that were not reasonably
foreseeable breaks the causal connection).
184. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 372-73 (indicating that although Nazario directly
caused the plaintiff’s rape, this injury never would have occurred had the military accurately
performed its duty and not enlisted Nazario).
185. See Thompson, 652 P.2d at 264 (stating that under the third prong of the test, if the
injury to the plaintiff was not a foreseeable result of the original negligence, then the act
qualifies as a supervening event); see also Directive 1304.26, supra note 180, at 7-8
(explaining that the purpose of the regulations barring the enlistment of those with a prior
felony conviction is to prevent injury from occurring to those in the military due to the
enlistment of felons). Cf. Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012 (finding that both the rape and
murder of the service member’s wife were a foreseeable result of the military negligently
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a special relationship between the military and the plaintiff because the
government had a specific responsibility to protect the plaintiff, and others
in her position, from preventable harm. 186 The government’s affirmative
act, its negligence in hiring, was the action that exposed the plaintiff to risk
and, therefore, the government is liable regardless of Nazario’s criminal
action. 187 The rape was, therefore, an intervening force that was a
foreseeable consequence of the government’s negligence in its hiring of
Nazario and does not break the chain of causation. 188
In Gonzalez, the negligent hiring, although separated significantly in
time from the moment of the actual injury, does not create a chain of
causation too attenuated to support a negligence claim. 189 There was no
occurrence during the nine-month period between negligence and injury
that would cause a break in the chain except for the passage of time. 190
There is no indication that a person who has committed only one felony
several years ago is no longer foreseeably dangerous after a certain amount
of time has passed. 191 If anything, the presumption within the military falls
the other way because regulations bar those even with merely one juvenile

hiring a prior convicted felon).
186. See Directive 1304.26, supra note 180, at 8 (indicating that the military has a
responsibility, which inherently amounts to a special relationship, to prevent enlistees with
prior felonies on their records from harming others within the military); see also Joyce, 672
P.2d at 1173-74 (stating that if a special relationship exists between the original actor and
the potentially injured party, the original actor has a duty to protect those persons from the
intentional criminal actions of third parties).
187. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that the military failed in its duty to perform
accurate background checks on all its enlistees since Nazario had a prior felony on his
record); see also Joyce, 672 P.2d at 1174 (explaining that if the affirmative action taken by
the original actor put the plaintiff in the position for a third party to injury the plaintiff, then
the original actor is liable regardless of the third party’s criminal act).
188. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012-13 (stating that rape is a foreseeable consequence
when the military negligently hires a prior convicted felon); see also Thompson, 652 P.2d at
263-64 (indicating that an intervening force does not break the causal chain and subject the
original actor to liability if the intervening force was one that was sufficiently foreseeable
based on the original act).
189. See Brady, 400 F.2d at 357 (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim satisfies proximate
cause even if there was a significant lapse in time, if the original actor should have foreseen
that, based on the negligence, an injury could occur, provided that there are no other
supervening actions). Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (explaining that a court cannot significantly separate the injury in
time from the negligence because, if it does, there is no proximate cause). However, if there
is a continuous chain of events between the moment of negligence and the injury, there is no
remoteness in time. Id.
190. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that Nazario approached the military “in the
fall of 1998” to begin the enlistment process); see also Leigh, 361 P.2d at 854 (explaining
that because the stability of the roof should have lasted for up to ten years, the mere passage
of time, absent another force, does not qualify as a supervening act that breaks the chain of
causation between negligence and injury).
191. See Deerings W. Nursing Ctr., Div. of Hillhaven Corp. v. Scott, 787 S.W.2d 494,
496 (Tex. App. 1990) (inferring that if a person has demonstrated violent tendencies in the
past, it is likely that he might commit violent acts in the future).
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felony from enlisting. 192 Nor is there an indication that Nazario’s behavior
changed after nine months of enlistment in order to erase his past proclivity
towards violent behavior. 193 As the military knew or should have known of
the potential for injury if it enlisted a person who has a propensity for
violence, this satisfies proximate cause. 194 Therefore, in Gonzalez, the
military is liable because it breached its affirmative duty to complete an
accurate background check on Nazario in order to ensure the safety of its
enlisted members, and this breach was the reasonably foreseeable cause of
the plaintiff’s rape. 195
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the FTCA is to provide federal employees an avenue of
redress against the United States Government in instances where private
employees would be able to bring a negligence suit against their private
employers. 196 However, the Feres Doctrine limits this access and has
prevented the majority of cases from ever reaching an appropriate, let alone
desirable remedy, because courts tend to dismiss the claims of active duty
service members on a jurisdictional technicality without ever reaching the
merits of the cases. 197 Congress or the judicial branch needs to confine the
Feres Doctrine to its originally intended limits in order to provide a more
acceptable remedy to plaintiffs, such as the plaintiff in Gonzalez. 198
Furthermore, courts should not hide the military’s negligence in enlisting a
potentially dangerous member of the armed forces behind a doctrine that
192. See 32 C.F.R. § 96.3 (2005) (stating that criminal history checks apply to all
enlistees’ convictions or citations, both juvenile and adult).
193. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (failing to state if there was anything that occurred
during the nine-month period between enlistment and rape that would indicate that he no
longer had the ability to commit violent acts).
194. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012 (explaining that the perpetrator’s enlistment
proximately caused the rape and death of the plaintiff’s wife because, had the military not
allowed him to enlist, he would not have been able to attack the service member’s wife).
Therefore, there was a causal connection between the military’s negligent hiring and the
wife’s injury. Id.; see also Brady, 400 F.2d at 357 (finding that when the original actor
should have foreseen the potential for injury to the plaintiff at the time of the negligence,
absent another supervening force, proximate cause is satisfied).
195. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1014 (stating that when the military owes a duty to a
member of the military community, the military breaches this duty when it negligently
enlists a prior convicted felon). Furthermore, when that person injures another, and this
injury is foreseeable, a court can hold the military liable. Id.
196. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (explaining that a purpose for and rationale behind the
FTCA is to allow plaintiffs to have broad redress in federal district courts).
197. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Feres Doctrine without addressing the actual merits
of the claim).
198. See supra notes 152-169 and accompanying text (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the assault and battery exception would better allow plaintiffs to find relief
in the court system because it focuses on the negligence alleged, not on the negligence that
resulted in an assault and battery).
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courts never intended to be so broad. 199
The majority’s interpretation of the assault and battery exception
frustrates the purpose behind the FTCA because courts apply it so broadly
as to envelop within the exception even those assault and battery cases that
truly stem from a prior negligent act. 200 Given the appropriate opportunity,
the Supreme Court should resolve the discrepancies between the circuits
regarding negligent hiring claims in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s minority
position in order to provide potential plaintiffs with a fair remedy. 201
As the Third Circuit has stated, “the facts pleaded here, if true, cry out
for a remedy.” 202 A service member should feel unthreatened by fellow
service members while serving in the military and safe from violent crimes,
such as rape. 203 Rape should not be occurring as frequently as it is within
the military. 204 The strongest way to prevent this is to allow courts to
adjudicate these claims, because that is at least one true way to protect
order within the military.

199. See Persons, 925 F.2d at 296 n.7 (explaining that courts have broadened the Feres
Doctrine to encompass every claim even slightly related to military service).
200. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54-55 (barring not only claims that arise directly from an
assault or battery, but also negligence claims that have their roots in an assault or battery).
201. Compare id. (granting broad immunity to the government by barring any claim that
stems from an assault or battery), with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42 (allowing plaintiffs to
bring claims arising out of an assault or battery if the basis of the claim was a negligent act
or omission on the part of a government employee).
202. Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that the decision
in Feres binds the court, and precedent demonstrates that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
overturn Feres because the Court continues to refuse to grant certiorari to cases involving
this doctrine).
203. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (indicating that there are regulations that
prohibit the enlistment of persons with a felony on their criminal record).
204. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 371 (demonstrating that a fellow service member
raped the plaintiff, yet barring her claim because she was on active duty at the time of the
injury); see also Shiver, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (demonstrating that the plaintiff’s drill
sergeant raped her, yet leaving her without redress within the civilian courts); Corey, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (showing that the plaintiff’s Colonel raped her); Stubbs,
744 F.2d at 59 (stating that the plaintiff’s sergeant sexually harassed her, and left the
plaintiff so distraught over her lack of remedy that it caused her suicide). See generally
supra note 79 (indicating the numerous occurrences of sexual assault and harassment within
the military).
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